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The Macroeconomic Implications of the New Banking Capital Regulation in Emerging Markets: A Duopoly Model Adapted to Risk-Averse Banks

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  • Sebastián Nieto

Abstract

In order to analyze the impact of the new banking capital regulation (Basel II) on the business cycle in an emerging economy, I develop a duopoly model composed of domestic and foreign banks. The principal results are: by the conduct of new banking capital regulation, the assessment of credit risk carried out by an international bank in a given country not only affects the total loans in that country but also the total assets supplied in other countries. Second, analyzing risk-averse banks, as portfolio diversification increases, the change in loans allocated in a given country by an international bank as a proportion of the original investment and the total level of loans for that country can be harshly affected by the behavior of a foreign bank following only news" through the new capital regulation. Finally, even in the case that portfolio diversification increases without limits, the macroeconomic implication of a change of credit risk estimation, via the new capital regulation, is larger when banks are risk-neutral than risk-averse."

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastián Nieto, 2005. "The Macroeconomic Implications of the New Banking Capital Regulation in Emerging Markets: A Duopoly Model Adapted to Risk-Averse Banks," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000151:003609
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    File URL: http://revistas.urosario.edu.co/index.php/economia/article/view/1028/927
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market imperfection; Credit; Portfolio choice; Banking regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions

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