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Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union—Comments on a Roadmap

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  • Ansgar Belke

    (Department for Macroeconomics, University Duisburg-Essen, Universitätsstraße 12, 45117 Essen, Germany)

Abstract

The Van Rompuy Report and also additional proposals made by the European Commission outlined steps for a 'genuine Economic and Monetary Union'. This article explains, assesses and comments on the proposals made. Moreover, it outlines what could be recommendations in order to achieve a 'genuine Economic and Monetary Union'. For this purpose, details of the Interim Report are systematically evaluated. We also deal with different governance visions emerging from the ongoing euro area crisis and starts from different views of the 'North and the South' of the euro area on this issue. This contribution argues that there is an alternative option to the notion of cooperative fiscal federalism involving fiscal union, bailouts and debt mutualisation: competition-based fiscal federalism accompanied by a properly defined banking union. In order to be a successful one, any deal will have to come up with a successful recipe of how to (re-)create trust between European citizens and their elected governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Ansgar Belke, 2013. "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union—Comments on a Roadmap," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 1(1), pages 48-65.
    • Handle: RePEc:cog:poango:v1:y:2013:i:1:p:48-65
    DOI: 10.17645/pag.v1i1.90
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ansgar Belke, 2013. "A more effective euro area monetary policy than OMTs — gold-backed sovereign debt," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 48(4), pages 237-242, July.
    2. Ansgar Belke & Daniel Gros, 1998. "Asymmetric shocks and EMU: Is there a need for a stability fund?," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 33(6), pages 274-288, November.
    3. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    4. Antonio Di Cesare & Giuseppe Grande & Michele Manna & Marco Taboga, 2012. "Recent estimates of sovereign risk premia for euro-area countries," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 128, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
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    Cited by:

    1. Singh, Manish K. & Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2016. "Sovereign-bank linkages: Quantifying directional intensity of risk transfers in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 137-164.
    2. Ansgar Belke, 2014. "Monetary dialogue 2009–2014: Looking backward, looking forward," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 49(4), pages 204-211, July.
    3. Singh, Manish K. & Gómez-Puig, Marta & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón, 2015. "Bank risk behavior and connectedness in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 161-184.
    4. Dolls, Mathias & Fuest, Clemens & Heinemann, Friedrich & Peichl, Andreas, 2015. "Reconciling insurance with market discipline: A blueprint for a European fiscal union," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-044, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Belke, Ansgar & Dobrzańska, Anna & Gros, Daniel & Smaga, Paweł, 2016. "(When) should a non-euro country join the banking union?," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 14(PA), pages 4-19.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking union; debt mutualisation; EU governance; Euro budget; Eurozone; genuine Economic and Monetary Union; North–South divide; shock absorber;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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