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The Role of Negotiators in Union-Firm Bargaining

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  • Stephen R. G. Jones

Abstract

Differences between the objectives of union leaders and those of the rank and file have traditionally been thought the result of political processes or irrationality. This paper shows that such differences will naturally arise as part of a rational bargaining strategy, since delegation of authority to a negotiator permits the union members to achieve advantageous commitment. This use of negotiators leads to revised interpretation of many popular theories of wage and employment determination, such as the efficient bargain and the right-to-manage models, and has implications for the interpretation of econometric modeling of union behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen R. G. Jones, 1989. "The Role of Negotiators in Union-Firm Bargaining," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 630-642, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:22:y:1989:i:3:p:630-42
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    1. repec:lic:licosd:22809 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2005. "Strategic union delegation and strike activity," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(1), pages 149-173, February.
    3. Ana Mauleon & Huasheng Song & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2010. "Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 471-500, June.
    4. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2006. "Strategic union delegation and incentives for merger," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 1-5.
    5. Schotter, Andrew & Zheng, Wei & Snyder, Blaine, 2000. "Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 248-292, February.
    6. Gustafsson, Johan & Sjögren, Tomas, 2024. "Can Labor Market Imperfections Motivate the Implementation of an Income-Based Pension System?," Umeå Economic Studies 1024, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    7. Zhou, J., 2010. "Access to justice : An economic approach," Other publications TiSEM 9d70f451-35c4-4878-92bf-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Persyn, Damiaan, 2013. "Union wage demands with footloose firms and agglomeration forces," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 142-150.
    9. Lutz Arnold & Stefanie Trepl, 2015. "A North-South Trade Model of Offshoring and Unemployment," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(5), pages 999-1039, November.
    10. Julian Lamprecht & Marcel Thum, 2023. "Opacity in bargaining over public good provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(5), pages 1069-1095, October.
    11. Gaston, N., 2000. "Unions and the Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining in a Globalising World," ISER Discussion Paper 0495, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    12. Eckert, Heather, 2003. "Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-24, July.
    13. Pei-Cheng Liao, 2014. "Strategic Delegation of Multiple Tasks," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1-2), pages 77-96, June.

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