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Direkt gewählte Politiker straffen die Verwaltung

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  • Stefanie Gäbler
  • Rösel Felix

Abstract

In einer neuen Studie zeigen wir, dass die lokale Arbeitslosigkeit sinkt, wenn der Landrat direkt vom Volk und nicht vom Kreistag gewählt wird. Unsere Ergebnisse beruhen auf einem Vergleich von Landkreisen in Brandenburg, wo bei zu geringer Wahlbeteiligung die Direktwahl ungültig wird und der Kreistag anstelle der Wähler den Landrat bestimmt. Den Rückgang der Arbeitslosigkeit führen wir auf eine bessere Organisation des lokalen Jobcenters im Landratsamt zurück. Direkt gewählte Politiker sind offenbar zu mutigeren Reformen bereit.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefanie Gäbler & Rösel Felix, 2019. "Direkt gewählte Politiker straffen die Verwaltung," ifo Dresden berichtet, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 26(04), pages 03-07, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifodre:v:26:y:2019:i:04:p:03-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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