Pflichtversicherung gegen Flutschäden?
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Pflichtversicherung; Elementarschadenversicherung; Adverse Selektion; Kreditgeschäft; Naturkatastrophe;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
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