The Republic of Belarus: the Evolution of the Policy of Balancing between East and West

The article is devoted to the analysis of one of the main causes of the Russian-Belarusian crisis of 2018-2019 -the Pro-Western vector of the Belarusian foreign policy. Since the establishment of the Union state of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation (1999), Minsk’s policy towards the European Union and the United States has always been of a special non-bloc nature. Minsk traditionally links its foreign policy with the task of preserving the sovereignty and independence of Belarus. At the same time, the Belarusian leadership has always stressed its status as Russias “only ally†. However, gradually the foreign policy of Minsk began to acquire a Pro-Western character, which began to have a negative impact on the Russian-Belarusian integration. Over time, Minsk for a number of reasons began to shy away from supporting its ally in the foreign arena, the foreign policy of Belarus has acquired the character of balancing between Russia and the West. The policy of balancing allowed Minsk to ignore the lack of political and economic balance of interests within the framework of Russian-Belarusian integration for more than twenty years. For many years, Minsk has used the Western vector of its foreign policy to stimulate Russian economic support for the Belarusian economy. In 20142018, amid the escalation of the confrontation between the West and Russia, the policy of balancing Minsk began to gradually reformat into a slow geopolitical turn of the Republic to the West. Currently, the Belarusian leadership uses the Western vector of its foreign policy to mask the gradual change of the geopolitical vector on the one hand, and to maintain access to Russian financial and energy resources on the other hand. By 2018, both formed opposite trends against the backdrop of the aggravation of the Ukrainian crisis resonated, which led to a crisis in relations between Russia and Belarus and jeopardized the preservation of the Union state.