Tarification algorithmique et collusion tacite en vertu du droit de la concurrence

Algorithmic pricing is a pervasive practice across the globe. It provides many benefits?for example, it can lead to prices that are very well suited to both consumers and market circumstances, due to its ability to process much larger datasets in significantly reduced timespans. These advantages come with the perils of collusive behavior, as algorithms may engage in back-and-forth signaling with rival systems until a stable price has been established. In the framework of EU competition law, neither tacit collusion nor price announcements are in principle prohibited. With reference to the potentially disruptive nature of algorithmic pricing, some legal scholarship has argued that traditional legal or economic concepts are unsuited to modern forms of collusion. Therefore, it has been suggested to expand the currently applicable EU antitrust laws to cover algorithmic (tacit) collusion. However, such proposals do not consider the current need for algorithms, especially in oligopolistic online markets, to take into account the pricing strategies of rivals so as to efficiently decide on one?s own price. In addition, algorithmic pricing may already come under the scope of the prohibition on concerted practices, with the European Commission already holding various relevant tools, exceptions, and competences. Rather than resorting to new regulatory initiatives, we should therefore aspire to first improve our empirical and technological understanding of how algorithmic pricing may (not) work and exhaust the current set of available antitrust instruments.