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Les banquiers rationnent-ils plus le crédit aux entreprises ? Résultats d'une enquête régionale

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  • Sylvie Cieply

Abstract

Has credit rationing increased in France over the last ten years? This article looks for an answer by comparing the results of the same survey carried out in 2000 and 2012 on two different but comparable samples of bankers specialized in firms? financing. Our results confirm that strong credit rationing (total refusal) is limited to potential customers although weak credit rationing (restrictive quantity) is used to regulate the credit market when relationships between banks and firms has been established. Our results indicate too that both total refusals and quantitative restrictions are less often used by bankers in 2012 than in 2000 and that bankers more frequently introduce collaterals and covenants in debt contracts. Despite the amendment of usury ceilings for firms, the role of interest rates remains low. We observe that this decrease in credit rationing comes with the rationalization of the system for taking decisions on the basis of financial criteria. Classification JEL: D82, G21.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvie Cieply, 2014. "Les banquiers rationnent-ils plus le crédit aux entreprises ? Résultats d'une enquête régionale," Revue d'économie financière, Association d'économie financière, vol. 0(4), pages 317-332.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:refaef:ecofi_116_0317
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    Cited by:

    1. Zakari Yaou KAKA & Amadou HAIDARA, 2023. "rôle des signaux financiers dans la réduction des asymétries d’informations," Journal of Academic Finance, RED research unit, university of Gabes, Tunisia, vol. 14(1), pages 132-144, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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