Choix d'écoles en France. Une évaluation de la procédure Affelnet

In this paper, using matching theory, we analyze the assignment procedure of students to high schools used in France : the Affelnet procedure. We show that this procedure is equivalent to the deferred-acceptance procedure where schools propose, defined by Gale and Shapley [1962]. We deduce that a certain number of properties are fulfilled by the Affelnet procedure. Specifically, it is stable and hard to manipulate. However, it has two major drawbacks : first, among all stable procedures, it is the one yielding the worst assignment from the view point of students. Second, the Affelnet procedure does not respect priorities : if a student gets a higher priority at all schools (for instance, by improving his grades), he may get a final assignment which makes him worse off. We also discuss two additional elements of the Affelnet procedure : the constraint on the number of schools that parents are allowed to rank, as well as, the existence of a bonus for schools ranked first in the preference list. Finally, we point out the existence of an alternative procedure, the deferred-acceptance procedure where students propose which does respect priorities and is the most efficient among all stable procedures. We run simulations to assess the impact of the adoption of this procedure on students? welfare. We relate the efficiency gains to specific characteristics of students? preferences. Classification JEL : C78, D78.