La diffusion d’information financière aux salariés dans trois entreprises sidérurgiques françaises (1945-1982) : une lecture bourdieusienne

According to textbooks, the trade and the general press, reporting to employees is a good practice that can, for example, improve the performance of the company concerned. This view seems widely accepted without any empirical verification on the part of those who support it. As such, this view can be seen as a doxa. However, an analysis of the practices of managers in three large companies in the French steel industry over the period 1945-1982 indicates that reporting to employees can create a dilemma for managers. In the vast majority of cases, they act as if the information revealed was unnecessary or even harmful to the effectiveness of their action. Nevertheless, in rare cases, they do pass on the information to employees, but in an opportunistic way. To unravel this apparent paradox and provide a theoretical response, we use the concept of doxa as presented and used by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. According to this author, each field (here industrial relations) has its own particular doxa (ideas taken for granted), which has two functions: firstly, it allows the possibility of constant communication between management and employees or their representatives; that is why it is in the interest of both parties to believe or pretend to believe. On the other hand, it allows managers to continue to dominate employees, which is why both managers and the professional press continue to promote the practice.