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Why farm households have differences in corruption experiences? Evidences from Bangladesh

Author

Listed:
  • Asif Reza ANIK

    (Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Agricultural University (BSMRAU), Gazipur, Bangladesh)

  • Siegfried BAUER

    (JustusLiebig University Giessen, Geissen, Germany)

  • Mohammad Jahangir ALAM

    (Bangladesh Agricultural University, Mymensingh 2202, Bangladesh)

Abstract

The article explores the household-level determinants of corruption and its different forms in Bangladesh. It also identifies the micro-level factors for which households pay different amount of bribe. To attain these objectives, experiences of 210 Bangladeshi farm households belonging to six different districts of the country are analyzed. The econometric analyses show that the households with higher expenditure are more likely to face corruption and bribery, and also pay a higher amount of bribe. However, these households are less likely to face the negligence of duty and nepotism or favouritism. Such differences in the impact of the expenditure variable can be argued to be the outcome of a situation where corruption is pervasive and the officials have the bribe maximizing objective. Relationships with different power entities reduce the households' probability to face corruption and its different forms, and can avoid a higher bribe payment. The results argue for several policy actions for combating corruption in the country.

Suggested Citation

  • Asif Reza ANIK & Siegfried BAUER & Mohammad Jahangir ALAM, 2013. "Why farm households have differences in corruption experiences? Evidences from Bangladesh," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 59(10), pages 478-488.
    • Handle: RePEc:caa:jnlage:v:59:y:2013:i:10:id:41-2013-agricecon
    DOI: 10.17221/41/2013-AGRICECON
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    References listed on IDEAS

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