IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/pepspp/v15y2009i1n4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Atoms for Peace, Redux: Energy Codependency for Sustained Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula

Author

Listed:
  • Beardsley Kyle

    (Emory University)

  • Lim Jamus J

    (The World Bank and Santa Cruz Center for International Economics)

Abstract

North Korea's nuclear program is a threat to sustained stability on the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, the traditional notion of "Atoms for Peace'' has been a failure in the engagement of the North. In this paper we propose a novel approach to mutual cooperation in energy provision on the Korean peninsula, premised on having North Korea host reactors that deliver energy to South Korea. We establish conditions where there exists a stable, time-consistent equilibrium where the North never finds it in its interest to disrupt energy supplies to the South, and where the South is willing to pay the fixed costs of nuclear plant construction in exchange for a discounted stream of energy supply from the North. We also show that third-party income streams can augment the cooperative relationship.

Suggested Citation

  • Beardsley Kyle & Lim Jamus J, 2009. "Atoms for Peace, Redux: Energy Codependency for Sustained Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 50-78, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:15:y:2009:i:1:n:4
    DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1129
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1129
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1554-8597.1129?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. Powell, Robert, 2004. "The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 231-241, May.
    3. Powell, Robert, 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 169-203, January.
    4. Isard Walter & Azis Iwan J., 1999. "A Cooperative Analysis Procedure for Use by Diplomats and Negotiators: With a Proposed Step for Resolving Conflict on the Korean Peninsula," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-24, January.
    5. Masahiko Aoki, 2001. "Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011875, April.
    6. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    7. Soo-Bin Park, 2004. "The North Korean Economy: Current Issues and Prospects," Carleton Economic Papers 04-05, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. John Tyson Chatagnier, 2015. "Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 237-268, April.
    2. Jack Paine, 2024. "A comment on Powell and formal models of power sharing ," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(2), pages 212-233, April.
    3. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Rubin, Jared & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2015. "Commitment problems in conflict resolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 33-45.
    4. Juan Escobar, 2008. "Cooperation and Self-Governance in Heterogeneous Communities," Discussion Papers 07-038, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    5. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2018. "Confronting an enemy with unknown preferences: Deterrer or provocateur?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 124-143.
    6. Martin Austvoll Nome, 2013. "When do commitment problems not cause war? Turkey and Cyprus, 1964 versus 1974," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 16(1), pages 50-73, March.
    7. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2017. "Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 177-189.
    8. Ernesto Dal Bó & Robert Powell, 2009. "A Model of Spoils Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 207-222, January.
    9. Robert Shum, 2014. "China, the United States, bargaining, and climate change," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-100, March.
    10. Wandel, Jürgen, 2011. "Integrierte Strukturen im Agrar- und Ernährungssektor Russlands: Entstehungsgründe, Funktionsweise, Entwicklungsperspektiven und volkswirtschaftliche Auswirkungen. Band I und II," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 63, number 63.
    11. Abbink, Klaus & Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo, 2023. "Preventive wars," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 552-569.
      • Klaus Abbink & Lu Dong & Lingbo Huang, 2022. "Preventive Wars," Discussion Papers 2022-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    12. Sandroni, Alvaro & Urgun, Can, 2017. "Dynamics in Art of War," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 51-58.
    13. Albornoz, Facundo & Hauk, Esther, 2014. "Civil war and U.S. foreign influence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 64-78.
    14. Häfner, Samuel, 2012. "Clausewitz on Auctions," Working papers 2012/12, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    15. Goddard, Ellen W. & Shank, Benjamin & Panter, Chris & Nilsson, Tomas K.H. & Cash, Sean B., 2007. "Canadian Chicken Industry: Consumer Preferences, Industry Structure and Producer Benefits from Investment in Research and Advertising," Project Report Series 52088, University of Alberta, Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology.
    16. Vincenzo Scoppa, 2003. "Contratti incompleti ed enforcement endogeno. Una rassegna della letteratura," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 391-440.
    17. Janus, Thorsten & Lim, Jamus Jerome, 2009. "Sticks and carrots: Two incentive mechanisms supporting intra-group cooperation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 177-180, March.
    18. Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2013. "Commitment in utility regulation: A model of reputation and policy applications," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 210-231.
    19. Buskens, Vincent, 2003. "Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 235-252, February.
    20. Colin Krainin & John Slinkman, 2017. "Bargaining with a biased autocrat," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 273-298, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    nuclear policy; Korean peninsula;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:15:y:2009:i:1:n:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.