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Die Finanzkrise und der Ruf nach mehr Europa / The financial crisis and the call for “more Europe”

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  • Möschel Wernhard

Abstract

The call for “more Europe” has to do with fundamental currents in the process of european integration. At the same time it is said to give an answer to the present financial crisis. The fundamental currents can be systematized as the peace-argument, the internal market-argument, the imperial argument and the German-Argument. Some specific interests of the individual member states have to be added. Objectives and instruments, finally, are not in a proportionate relation. The present crisis is due to the political load of the project common currency. From a german perspective the aim was to make the process of the european integration “irreversible”. The peculiarities of the markets were heavily underestimated, the failing weight of the “no bail out-clause” in case of a banking crisis was not considered. Erronneously on trusting on the binding force of international treaties even then when core elements of policy were at stake. From a french perspective the target was to eliminate the “imperialism of the Deutsch-Mark”. The french diplomacy pursued its interests in a masterly manner. To overcome policy defects by an extension of policy seems rather grotesque. The concept of a federal European state lacks all necessary prerequisites. In addition one is handed over to the unknown results of majority decisions. The present policy of the European Central Bank is an example for that. The continuing responsibility of a member state has, under these conditions, the character of a safe harbour. As far as the currency union is concerned three options can be distinguished: The actual policy of saving banks and states is continued. The failure of this policy is not yet sure. When the attitude of buying time does not lead to lasting structural reforms we reach a transfer union.Imperative would be a revival of the no bail out-principle and determined resistance against all efforts to transform elements of a crisis-management into a rule of durability. Proposals from a green table to split up the currency union do not find a political majority and jeopardize in their antagonism the project of european integration itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Möschel Wernhard, 2013. "Die Finanzkrise und der Ruf nach mehr Europa / The financial crisis and the call for “more Europe”," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 64(1), pages 475-486, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:64:y:2013:i:1:p:475-486:n:24
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2013-0124
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dietrich Murswiek, 2013. "»Euro-Rettung« und Grundgesetz," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(07), pages 22-30, April.
    2. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2012. "Die Target-Kredite der Deutschen Bundesbank," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65, pages 03-34, March.
    3. Thomas Gstädtner, 2013. "Ein europäisches Bankenrestrukturierungsrecht als Grundbestandteil der europäischen Bankenunion," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(07), pages 12-21, April.
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    1. Walterscheid, Heike, 2014. "Staatsverschuldung, Banken und Demokratie: Die Bedeutung von Sinnverbund und der Einheit von Handeln und Haften in der Schuldenkrise der EWU," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2014 (Goettingen) 107397, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.

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