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Gefangen im Dilemma? Ein strategischer Ansatz der Wahlund Revolutionsteilnahme / Trapped in Dilemma? A Strategic Approach to explain Participation in Elections and Revolutions

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  • Möller Marie

Abstract

The voting out of a government or the disempowerment of a dictator may fail if there is no incentive for the individual to participate. A strategic approach is developed which shows the election-participation-decision as an N person chicken-game. With the introduction of selective benefits, the problem is solved insofar as there is only one Nashequilibrium in which everyone participates. The participation in a revolution can be represented as an N person prisoner's dilemma, which can be transformed into a coordination problem - though only if the first-mover-problem that arises can be solved. The result of the strategic approach is that the "stay-in-power-restriction" is mandatory for democratic governments only. Therefore this paper provides one more theoretical explanation for the positive correlation between the degree of democracy and prosperity in cross section comparisons.

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  • Möller Marie, 2011. "Gefangen im Dilemma? Ein strategischer Ansatz der Wahlund Revolutionsteilnahme / Trapped in Dilemma? A Strategic Approach to explain Participation in Elections and Revolutions," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 425-454, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:425-454:n:19
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2011-0119
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