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Europäische Geldpolitik: Gefährdungspotentiale - Handlungsmöglichkeiten - Glaubwürdigkeit

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  • Görgens Egon

Abstract

With the beginning of EMU in 1999 the Eurosystem is responsible for the single monetary policy in the Euro-area. But will the Eurosystem take over the role as a power that ensures the market order by giving EMU the status of a stability community with an Euro underpinning a competitive network? In the light of von Hayek’s proposition of a currency competition there seems little space for optimism, because the introduction of the Euro virtually is a restriction of currency-competition. With the priority of price stability and the political and legal independence of the Eurosystem important prerequisites are established to avoid the Hayek-problem. Because a European central government does not exist the danger of corresponding pressures cannot arise. But pressures from national economic policies and from interest groups behind them will remain. Until now the Eurosystem altogether with the ECB was successful in defending its monetary policy and anchoring a piece of stability culture in the member countries of EMU.

Suggested Citation

  • Görgens Egon, 2002. "Europäische Geldpolitik: Gefährdungspotentiale - Handlungsmöglichkeiten - Glaubwürdigkeit," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 53(1), pages 31-58, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:53:y:2002:i:1:p:31-58:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2002-0105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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