Ursachen systemischer Bankenkrisen: Erklärungsversuche, empirische Evidenz und wirtschaftspolitische Konsequenzen

In view of the increased frequency and economic costs of banking crises in a growing number of countries around the world concerns about the stability of national financial systems in a globalized world economy have come to the forefront of academic and policy discussions. In the literature considerable attention has already been devoted to many potential causes of banking crises. However, the empirical evidence in favour of the competing theories is weak and the explanatory and predictive power of economic models remains low. The article argues that our knowledge of the forces which cause and propagate systemic banking crises can be considerably enhanced, when we clearly distinguish between three quite different groups of factors: (1) characteristics of the institutional structure which more or less predetermine what we might call systemic „fragility“ or „vulnerability“ of a specific banking system, (2) internal and external disturbing factors which may produce financial „crisis“ or „instability“ originating in fragile banking systems if the shock is sufficiently large, and (3) catalytic factors which determine the final magnitude, severity and costs of the arising financial sector crisis. Empirical evidence for Latin America, the Anglosaxon countries, Scandinavia, Japan and South-East Asia is presented which demonstrates that systemic banking crises indeed have multiple causes, but originate only in countries with institutional structures and preconditions which render their financial systems highly vulnerable to surprising and sufficiently strong adverse shocks. Finally, some policy conclusions are drawn from these results regarding crisis prevention, banking regulation, and institutional reform in the banking, corporate, and state sector, respectively.