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Constituency-based Lobbying as Corporate Political Strategy: Testing an Agency Theory Perspective

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  • Lord Michael D.

    (Wake Forest University)

Abstract

This study explores sources of variation in the efficacy of constituency building as corporate political strategy. The theoretical focus is on the persistent agency problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship between constituents and legislators. Analysis of data from key congressional respondents indicates that the nature of these agency problems significantly determines the relative effectiveness of corporate constituency building as a means to influence legislative decisionmaking. Corporate constituency building appears to be more effective for influencing legislators' voting behavior than for influencing the specific content of legislation; more effective in the House than the Senate; contingent on party affiliation; contingent on the types of feedback corporate stakeholders use to communicate with legislative offices; contingent on the types of corporate stakeholders involved. This paper discusses these findings in the context of the existing literature and makes suggestions for further inquiry into the use, efficacy, and evolution of constituency-based lobbying as corporate political strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Lord Michael D., 2000. "Constituency-based Lobbying as Corporate Political Strategy: Testing an Agency Theory Perspective," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-21, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:2:y:2000:i:3:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1012
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    Cited by:

    1. Saam, Nicole J., 2007. "Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 825-840, December.
    2. Clark Muntean Susan, 2011. "Corporate Independent Spending in the Post-BCRA to Pre-Citizens United Era," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-39, April.
    3. Feng, Yunting & Lai, Kee-hung & Zhu, Qinghua, 2020. "Legitimacy in operations: How sustainability certification announcements by Chinese listed enterprises influence their market value?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    4. Johnson, Clark D. & Bauer, Brittney C. & Carlson, Brad D., 2022. "Constituency building: Determining consumers’ willingness to participate in corporate political activities," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 42-57.
    5. Gastón de los Reyes & Markus Scholz, 2023. "Assessing the Legitimacy of Corporate Political Activity: Uber and the Quest for Responsible Innovation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 51-69, April.
    6. Ashley Baber, 2024. "Labour Market Engineers: Reconceptualising Labour Market Intermediaries with the Rise of the Gig Economy in the United States," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 38(3), pages 723-743, June.

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