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Staged Financing with a Variable Return

Author

Listed:
  • Smirnov Vladimir

    (University of Sydney, v.smirnov@econ.usyd.edu.au)

  • Wait Andrew

    (University of Sydney, a.wait@econ.usyd.edu.au)

Abstract

This paper explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. To mitigate hold-up we allow the parties to stage investments over time and derive the optimal investment path in a model that places no restrictions on the growth of collateral. Our model predicts that neither positive wealth of the entrepreneur nor the lack of discounting ensures that all profitable projects proceed. We also derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the project to be financeable when there are no costs of delay.

Suggested Citation

  • Smirnov Vladimir & Wait Andrew, 2007. "Staged Financing with a Variable Return," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-28, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:5
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1234
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2021. "Preemption with a second-mover advantage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 294-309.
    2. Thanh Tran & Kanghyun Yoon & Stefan Genchev, 2017. "Lump‐Sum versus Pay‐As‐You‐Go: The Moderating Effect of Contract Types on the Optimal Logistics Decisions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(4), pages 547-555, June.
    3. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2014. "Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 1069-1078, June.
    4. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Blocking in a timing game with asymmetric players," Working Papers 2018-05, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised May 2019.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    staged financing; hold-up;

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