IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/v18y2018i2p12n14.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Estimating the Use of Higher-Order Theory of Mind Using Computational Agents

Author

Listed:
  • de Weerd Harmen

    (Institute of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands)

  • Diepgrond Denny

    (Institute of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands)

  • Verbrugge Rineke

    (Institute of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands)

Abstract

When people make decisions in a social context, they often make use of theory of mind, by reasoning about unobservable mental content of others. For example, the behavior of a pedestrian who wants to cross the street depends on whether or not he believes that the driver of an oncoming car has seen him or not. People can also reason about the theory of mind abilities of others, leading to recursive thinking of the sort ‘I think that you think that I think…’. Previous research suggests that this ability may be especially effective in simple competitive settings. In this paper, we use a combination of computational agents and Bayesian model selection to determine to what extent people make use of higher-order theory of mind reasoning in a particular competitive game known as matching pennies. We find that while many children and adults appear to make use of theory of mind, participants are also often classified as using a simpler reactive strategy based only on the actions of the directly preceding round. This may indicate that human reasoners do not primarily use their theory of mind abilities to compete with others.

Suggested Citation

  • de Weerd Harmen & Diepgrond Denny & Verbrugge Rineke, 2018. "Estimating the Use of Higher-Order Theory of Mind Using Computational Agents," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-12, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:2:p:12:n:14
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0184
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0184
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/bejte-2016-0184?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July.
    2. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    3. Ben Meijering & Hedderik van Rijn & Niels A Taatgen & Rineke Verbrugge, 2012. "What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(9), pages 1-8, September.
    4. Johnson, Eric J. & Camerer, Colin & Sen, Sankar & Rymon, Talia, 2002. "Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 16-47, May.
    5. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
    6. Marie Devaine & Guillaume Hollard & Jean Daunizeau, 2014. "The Social Bayesian Brain: Does Mentalizing Make a Difference When We Learn?," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(12), pages 1-14, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hanshu Zhang & Frederic Moisan & Cleotilde Gonzalez, 2021. "Rock-Paper-Scissors Play: Beyond the Win-Stay/Lose-Change Strategy," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-15, June.
    2. Hanshu Zhang & Frederic Moisan & Cleotilde Gonzalez, 2021. "Rock-paper-scissors play: Beyond the win-stay/lose-change strategy," Post-Print hal-04325630, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dieter Balkenborg & Rosemarie Nagel, 2016. "An Experiment on Forward vs. Backward Induction: How Fairness and Level k Reasoning Matter," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 378-408, August.
    2. Benjamin Patrick Evans & Mikhail Prokopenko, 2021. "Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: The Quantal Hierarchy model of decision-making," Papers 2106.15844, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    3. Bendoly, Elliot & van Wezel, Wout & Bachrach, Daniel G. (ed.), 2015. "The Handbook of Behavioral Operations Management: Social and Psychological Dynamics in Production and Service Settings," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199357222.
    4. Healy, Paul J. & Park, Hyoeun, 2023. "Model selection accuracy in behavioral game theory: A simulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    5. Vincent P. Crawford, 2006. "Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000462, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Duffy, Sean & Smith, John, 2011. "Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game," MPRA Paper 30856, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, 2006. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1737-1768, December.
    8. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2014. "On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 102-125.
    9. Rogers, Brian W. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Camerer, Colin F., 2009. "Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1440-1467, July.
    10. Pedro Rey Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium PLay and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0506003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2012. "Level-k analysis of experimental centipede games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 548-566.
    12. García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore & Kovářík, Jaromír, 2020. "Non-equilibrium play in centipede games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 391-433.
    13. Pedro Rey-Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium Play and Best Reply to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0512003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Benjamin Patrick Evans & Mikhail Prokopenko, 2024. "Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: the quantal hierarchy model of decision making," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 71-111, February.
    15. Colin F. Camerer & Thomas R. Palfrey & Brian W. Rogers, 2006. "Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000193, UCLA Department of Economics.
    16. Bosch-Domènech, Antoni & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2013. "On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 52-67.
    17. David J. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2008. "Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1572-1595, October.
    18. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2004. "Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000345, UCLA Department of Economics.
    19. Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 449-468.
    20. Haruvy, Ernan & Stahl, Dale O., 2007. "Equilibrium selection and bounded rationality in symmetric normal-form games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 98-119, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:2:p:12:n:14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.