IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejmac/vtopics.6y2006i2n8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rating Agencies and Sovereign Debt Rollover

Author

Listed:
  • Carlson Mark

    (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve)

  • Hale Galina B

    (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)

Abstract

In order to explore how credit ratings may affect financial markets, we analyze a global game model of debt roll-over in which heterogeneous investors act strategically. We find that the addition of the rating agency has a non-monotonic effect on the probability of default and the magnitude of the response of capital flows to changes in fundamentals. We also establish that introducing a rating agency can bring multiple equilibria to a market that otherwise would have a unique equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlson Mark & Hale Galina B, 2006. "Rating Agencies and Sovereign Debt Rollover," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 1-32, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejmac:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:2:n:8
    DOI: 10.2202/1534-5998.1375
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5998.1375
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1534-5998.1375?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Grace Weishi Gu & Zachary R. Stangebye, 2023. "Costly Information And Sovereign Risk," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1397-1429, November.
    2. El-Shagi, Makram & Schweinitz, Gregor von, 2018. "The joint dynamics of sovereign ratings and government bond yields," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 198-218.
    3. Mathis, Jérôme & McAndrews, James & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2009. "Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 657-674, July.
    4. José Jorge, 2016. "Sovereign Ratings and Investor Behavior," CEF.UP Working Papers 1601, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    5. Steinar Holden & Gisle James Natvik & Adrien Vigier, 2012. "An equilibrium model of credit rating agencies," Working Paper 2012/23, Norges Bank.
    6. Alfarano, Simone & Camacho, Eva & Morone, Andrea, 2015. "Do investors rely too much on public information to be justified by its accuracy? An experimental study," FinMaP-Working Papers 30, Collaborative EU Project FinMaP - Financial Distortions and Macroeconomic Performance: Expectations, Constraints and Interaction of Agents.
    7. Giovanni Ferri & Andrea Morone, 2014. "The effect of rating agencies on herd behaviour," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 9(1), pages 107-127, April.
    8. Celjo-Hörhager, Sanela & Niessen, Alexandra, 2006. "How do self-fulfilling prophecies affect financial ratings? An experimental study," CFR Working Papers 06-13, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    9. Simone Alfarano & Andrea Morone & Eva Camacho, 2011. "The role of public and private information in a laboratory financial market," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    10. Mahmoud Elamin, 2012. "Believe only what you see: credit rating agencies, structured finance, and bonds," Working Papers (Old Series) 1222, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejmac:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:2:n:8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.