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A Note on the Valuation of Collective Goods: Overlooked Input Market Free Riding for Non-Individually Incrementable Goods

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  • Graves Philip E

    (University of Colorado at Boulder)

Abstract

For at least fifty years economists have argued that vertically-aggregated marginal willingness to pay, when set equal to marginal provision cost, will result in optimal public good provision levels. This methodological approach would be expected to yield an exact analog, in terms of optimal levels of public good provision, to efficient provision of private goods in a perfect market setting. There is, however, a potentially serious flaw in the approach as actually practiced, since initial incomes are implicitly-and wrongly-taken to be optimal. From a given income, the output demand revelation problem has long been recognized-that there will be difficulty inferring true demands for public goods at that income (the traditional `free rider' problem). But what has failed to receive widespread recognition among theoreticians, and especially among practitioners, is that there will also be a concomitant `input demand revelation' problem. In any situation where workers cannot individually increment a class of goods by increasing their income (e.g. public goods), they will have no incentive to generate the income that would have been devoted to that class of goods. They will only generate income that is optimal to pay the higher taxes or prices associated with whatever initial public goods levels are provided. As a consequence, the benefit-cost practitioner will, even if somehow able to accurately guess marginal willingness-to-pay out of current income, observe only one apparent optima. There are an infinite number of such optima, one for each level of free riding in input markets, where aggregated marginal willingness-to-pay will appear to equal marginal provision cost. The one true Samuelson `optimum optimorum' occurs when there is free riding in neither output nor input markets (that is, when the `full' demand revelation problem is solved). As a consequence, pure public goods, as well as other `non-incrementable' goods and goods for which non-use values are of importance will be undervalued, hence under-provided. Evidence is presented that the problem raised here might be of importance, undermining the practical significance of the Coase theorem vis-à-vis Pigouvian taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Graves Philip E, 2009. "A Note on the Valuation of Collective Goods: Overlooked Input Market Free Riding for Non-Individually Incrementable Goods," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-20, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:5
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2178
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    Cited by:

    1. Graves, Philip E., 2012. "Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental Projects: A Plethora of Biases Understating Net Benefits," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(3), pages 1-25, August.
    2. Philip E. Graves, 2011. "Appropriate Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle: Proper Stimulus Policies Can Work," The IUP Journal of Governance and Public Policy, IUP Publications, vol. 0(2), pages 26-32, June.
    3. Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2017. "Gaming modeling of self-enforcing agreements and free-rider problem," MPRA Paper 80818, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Philip E. Graves, 2010. "Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental Projects: A Plethora of Systematic Biases," CESifo Working Paper Series 3144, CESifo.
    5. Graves, Philip E., 2017. "Implications of global warming: Two eras," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 7, pages 9-14.
    6. Amiran, Edoh Y. & Hagen, Daniel A., 2018. "What do income tests tell us about the gap between WTA and WTP for public goods?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 134-146.
    7. Graves, Philip E., 2017. "Global Climate Policy Will Have Net Benefits Larger Than Anyone Thinks (and Welfare Gains, Strangely, Are Likely To Be Much Larger Yet)," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 73-76.
    8. Yung Yau, 2011. "Willingness to Participate in Collective Action: The Case of Multi-owner Housing Management," ERES eres2011_155, European Real Estate Society (ERES).
    9. Mamedov, Arseny (Мамедов, Арсений) & Hudko, E. (Худько, Е.) & Belev, Sergei (Белев, Сергей) & Moguchev, Nikita Sergeevich (Могучев, Никита Сергеевич), 2016. "Comparative Analysis of the Effectiveness of Individual Instruments of State Investment Policy [Сравнительный Анализ Эффективности Применения Отдельных Инструментов Государственной Инвестиционной П," Working Papers 3052, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    10. Yung Yau, 2018. "Tripartite Efficacy Beliefs and Homeowner Participation in Multi-Owned Housing Governance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-17, September.
    11. Philip E. Graves, 2010. "A Note on the Design of Experiments Involving Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 3187, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    decision making; choice behavior; public goods; willingness-to-pay; willingness-to-accept; non-use value; Coase theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics
    • Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects
    • A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
    • N5 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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