The Value of Information in Regulation
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2495
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- Häggquist, Elisabeth & Söderholm, Patrik, 2015. "The economic value of geological information: Synthesis and directions for future research," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 91-100.
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Keywords
environmental policy; pollution; optimal uninformed tax;All these keywords.
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