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Uncertainty Regarding Interpretation of the “Negligence Rule” and Its Implications for the Efficiency of Outcomes

Author

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  • Jain Satish K.

    (Jawaharlal Nehru University, CESP/SSS, JNU, New Delhi 110067, India)

Abstract

There are two ways that the negligence rule is interpreted. Under one interpretation a negligent injurer is liable for the entire harm to the victim; and under the other interpretation a negligent injurer is liable only for that part of the harm which can be ascribed to his negligence. Both these versions are efficient. However, if there is uncertainty regarding whether the court will be employing the full liability version or the incremental liability version for determining the liability of a negligent injurer, notwithstanding the fact that both the versions are efficient, inefficiency is possible. It is shown in the paper that a necessary and sufficient condition for efficiency in all cases is that the subjective probability with which the injurer expects the standard version to be employed must be greater than or equal to the subjective probability with which the victim expects the standard version to be employed. For the subset of applications without complementarities in the cares of the two parties and which are such that the total social costs are minimized at a unique care-configuration, it is shown that efficiency obtains regardless of the subjective probabilities with which the parties expect the two versions. One very important conclusion that emerges from the analysis of this paper is that when courts employ more than one liability rule, even if all the employed rules are efficient, the efficiency of all outcomes cannot be taken for granted merely on the ground of the efficiency of the employed rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Jain Satish K., 2016. "Uncertainty Regarding Interpretation of the “Negligence Rule” and Its Implications for the Efficiency of Outcomes," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 147-168, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:7:y:2016:i:2:p:147-168:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2015-0031
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kahan, Marcel, 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 427-447, June.
    2. Satish Jain, 2010. "On the efficiency of the negligence rule," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 343-359.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    full liability; incremental liability; incremental version; necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency; negligence rule; standard version; uncertainty regarding interpretation of negligence rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics

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