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The Impact of Globalization of Antitrust Law on Developing Countries: Harmony or Hegemony?

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  • Bradstreet Richard S.

    (University of Cape Town)

Abstract

In the light of today's rampant globalization, there is an increasing need for developing a system of antitrust that serves to regulate the world market. This article describes the problems relating to the globalization of antitrust in the face of differing, and often conflicting, aims of domestic antitrust law and argues that a globally applicable system of antitrust needs to treat all state players in the global market equally by taking into account the needs of each domestic economy.Since domestic antitrust law is aimed at protecting domestic interests, a globally applicable system of antitrust must recognize the dissymmetry between the goals of antitrust in developed and developing countries, and will require a single global antitrust policy which should inform the domestic jurisprudence of all states, thereby forcing domestic authorities to also take into account the interests of foreign jurisdictions so as to not impede economic development abroad.Harmonization of antitrust should reflect the interests of the global market, which would be best regulated by a system based on a global antitrust policy that addresses the specific needs of developing economies and aims at establishing a more level playing field in the global economic arena.Owing to the self-interest inherent in state actions and domestic systems of antitrust, a neutral international body such as the World Trade Organization will need to establish a globally applicable antitrust policy, and facilitate both its initial negotiation and its enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Bradstreet Richard S., 2011. "The Impact of Globalization of Antitrust Law on Developing Countries: Harmony or Hegemony?," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-34, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:2:y:2011:i:3:n:3
    DOI: 10.2202/2154-4611.1047
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barbara Koremenos, 2007. "If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 189-212, January.
    2. Steinberg, Richard H., 2002. "In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 339-374, April.
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