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The Case for a European Credit Council: Historical and Constitutional Fine-Tuning

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  • van ’t Klooster Jens

    (Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Abstract

Eric Monnet’s European Credit Council (ECC) is an innovative, historically-grounded institutional proposal for supporting the ECB in the design of its monetary policy operations. In this commentary, I seek to strengthen the case for the European Credit Council drawing on work in progress on the history of the ECB. I first discuss the tradition of moderate interventionism as it appears in Monnet’s (Monnet, E. (2018). Controlling credit: Central banking and the planned economy in Postwar France, 1948–1973. Cambridge University Press) study Controlling Credit. I show that the model of moderate interventionism was well-known to the drafters of the ECB statutes and efforts to categorically rule such policies out were simply unsuccessful. I suggest that this fortuitous choice has left ample legal space in the EU treaties for an ECC.

Suggested Citation

  • van ’t Klooster Jens, 2024. "The Case for a European Credit Council: Historical and Constitutional Fine-Tuning," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 519-532.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:14:y:2024:i:4:p:519-532:n:1004
    DOI: 10.1515/ael-2022-0074
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Credit Council; Central Bank independence; democracy; credit policies; sustainable finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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