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Bank resolution and safeguarding the creditors left behind

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Not for the first time, the global banking crisis illustrated the vulnerability of banks to a loss of confidence by their depositors, other creditors and counterparties. The experience highlighted the need to have special arrangements for dealing with failing banks - ‘special resolution regime’ — that provides the authorities with the tools necessary to reduce the systemic risks arising from a bank’s failure while at the same time limiting the taxpayers’ exposure to the costs. The United Kingdom’s own Special Resolution Regime for dealing with failing banks and building societies was born out of the difficulties in dealing with the failure of Northern Rock in the autumn of 2007.

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  • Davies, Geoffrey & Dobler, Marc, 2011. "Bank resolution and safeguarding the creditors left behind," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 51(3), pages 213-223.
    • Handle: RePEc:boe:qbullt:0056
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ms. Inci Ötker & Mr. Aditya Narain & Ms. Anna Ilyina & Jay Surti, 2011. "The Too-Important-to-Fail Conundrum: Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 2011/012, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Brierley, Peter, 2009. "Financial Stability Paper No 5: The UK Special Resolution Regime for Failing Banks in an International Context," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 5, Bank of England.
    3. Inci Ötker & Aditya Narain & Anna Ilyina & Jay Surti, 2011. "The Too-Important-to-Fail Conundrum; Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 11/12, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Herring, Richard J., 2011. "The Central Role of Resolution Policy in Dealing with Systemically Important Financial Institution," Working Papers 11-71, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
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    1. Gracie, Andrew & Chennells, Lucy & Menary, Mark, 2014. "The Bank of England’s approach to resolving failed institutions," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 54(4), pages 409-418.
    2. Chennells, Lucy & Wingfield, Venetia, 2015. "Bank failure and bail-in: an introduction," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 55(3), pages 228-241.

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