Location matters: Valuing firm‐specific nonmarket risk in the global mining industry

Research summary Using collective action and social movement theory, we investigate the potential incentives and ability of stakeholders to engage in collective action that can increase firm‐specific nonmarket risk of mining companies. We argue that proximity to the nearest environmentally sensitive water source increases the probability that local stakeholders will take collective actions that impose material costs on the focal mine. We hypothesize that stock markets recognize this nonmarket risk and apply a discount on announcements related to mines located near such areas, and that these risks are moderated by the type of mineral, the nature of the water source, and the strength of host country institutions. Using a unique data set and an event study method, we find support for most of our arguments. Managerial summary We argue that mines located near environmentally sensitive water sources are subject to nonmarket risks arising from the potential collective actions of local stakeholders and their allies. Stakeholder mobilization can impose material costs on a mine in the form of delays, regulatory hurdles, and closure. We find that stock markets recognize these nonmarket risks and apply a discount on announcements by mining companies whose mines are located near environmentally sensitive water sources, particularly rivers. However, we also find that investor reaction is stronger in countries with strong institutions that support collective action. Thus, nonmarket risk management is important even in countries that are typically characterized by low political and institutional risks. We discuss the degree to which these results can be generalized beyond mining.