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The Negative Effects of Populism on Gay and Lesbian Rights

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  • Christine Pappas
  • Jeanette Mendez
  • Rebekah Herrick

Abstract

Objective. The objective of this article is to examine the degree to which populist features of state governments affect minority interests, particularly gays, lesbians, and bisexuals (GLB) Method. We examine the effects of specific institutional features that affect state government responsiveness to majority preferences on GLB policies: bans on same‐sex marriage and hate crime. We also control for variations in political environment. Results. Features that increase popular control over policy making and policymakers advance anti‐GLB policies but have little effect on pro‐GLB policies; however, legislative term limits have the opposite effect. Further, constituency size and senators' term length increases both types of policies. Conclusions. The findings indicate that an unpopular minority is likely to be harmed by populist features that increase the role of citizens and may be helped by features that shield legislators from majoritarian preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Christine Pappas & Jeanette Mendez & Rebekah Herrick, 2009. "The Negative Effects of Populism on Gay and Lesbian Rights," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 90(1), pages 150-163, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:90:y:2009:i:1:p:150-163
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2009.00608.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Crain, W Mark & Oakley, Lisa K, 1995. "The Politics of Infrastructure," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-17, April.
    2. Kuklinski, James H., 1978. "Representativeness and Elections: A Policy Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 165-177, March.
    3. Lowry, Robert C. & Alt, James E. & Ferree, Karen E., 1998. "Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 759-774, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bayerlein, Michael, 2021. "Chasing the Other 'Populist Zeitgeist'? Mainstream Parties and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 240403, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Attila Bartha & Zsolt Boda & Dorottya Szikra, 2020. "When Populist Leaders Govern: Conceptualising Populism in Policy Making," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(3), pages 71-81.

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