Corporate Environmental Behaviors in Voluntary Programs: Does Timing Matter?

Objective. Why do some firms participate in voluntary programs earlier than others? What conditions dictate whether firms participate in voluntary programs earlier rather than later? Current research on voluntary programs has not considered discrete processes in which corporate actors could have different motives and objectives in different time dimensions, that is, early versus late. Methods. We adopt a diffusion theory to disaggregate corporate voluntary participation behavior in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sponsored Green Lights (GL) voluntary program. We focus on the GL participants during two periods—the early joiners in 1993–1994, and the late joiners in 1995–1996. Results. At the early diffusion stage, firms are more likely driven by the market motive that garners a “green” reputation, an important strategic asset to promote market competitiveness; at the late diffusion stage, firms are more driven by the institutional motive to improve their relationships with regulatory agencies and subsequently relieve regulatory pressures from them. Conclusion. We find that firms have different motives for GL participation at different diffusion stages. We suggest that policymakers who want to induce firms to join voluntary programs should pay more attention to program designs and implementation schemes that accommodate different corporate interests and objectives in different time orders of firms' participations in voluntary programs.