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Institutional design and the stability of responsiveness in the American states

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  • Scott LaCombe

Abstract

Background There is a significant body of research investigating how institutions moderate the relationship between public opinion and policy in the American States, but far less attention has been given to understanding the variance of policy change. Some states have remained relatively stable in their ideological trajectory, while other states tend to see large unstable swings in policy. Objectives I argue that the variance of policy, not just the mean, is an important component of understanding policy responsiveness. A state's institutional design can influence both the extent to which policymakers follow public opinion and the ease of moving the status quo. Methods I use a heteroskedastic regression to model policy responsiveness and variance in the state using a measure of the strength of a state’s checks and balance system and a measure of accountability pressure. Results States with a robust checks and balances system see less policy variance, whereas there is mixed evidence that institutions designed to strengthen public opinion’s role in policy are associated with more stable policy. I also find that institutions play a much stronger role in reducing social policy variance compared to economic policy. Conclusion Variance should be incorporated into our understanding of policy responsiveness, and represents another dimension in which institutions may influence the relationship between public opinion and policy.

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  • Scott LaCombe, 2024. "Institutional design and the stability of responsiveness in the American states," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1205-1223, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:105:y:2024:i:4:p:1205-1223
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.13414
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