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Profit Sharing, Unions and Investments

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  • Hoel, Michael
  • Moene, Karl O

Abstract

The pay parameters in a profit-sharing system are likely to be determined by collective bargaining between unions and employers. In this case, employment will not necessarily be higher under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system. For a fixed capital stock, the most likely case is that profit sharing is better for unions and worse for employers than a fixed wage system. With endogenous investments, both parties may be worse off under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system. This might be one of the reasons why the authors in fact do not observe much profit sharing under collective bargaining. Copyright 1988 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoel, Michael & Moene, Karl O, 1988. "Profit Sharing, Unions and Investments," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(4), pages 493-505.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:90:y:1988:i:4:p:493-505
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    Cited by:

    1. Sandeep Bhargava & Tim Jenkinson, 1996. "Partage explicite ou implicite du profit dans la détermination des salaires," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 126(5), pages 19-29.
    2. Michaelis, Jochen, 1997. "On the equivalence of profit and revenue sharing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 113-118, November.
    3. Pablo González, 2002. "Profit Sharing Reconsidered: Efficiency Wages and Renegotiation Costs," Documentos de Trabajo 151, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    4. Domenico Buccella, 2016. "Profit sharing as entry deterrence mechanism," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 15(1), pages 17-31, April.

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