On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00116
Download full text from publisher
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999.
"Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June.
- Cukierman, A. & Lippi, F., 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence," Discussion Paper 1998-116, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Cukierman, A. & Lippi, F., 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence," Other publications TiSEM 887701f0-62c3-4059-9d6d-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Lippi, Francesco, 2000.
"Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 323-338, December.
- Lippi, F., 1999. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis," Papers 351, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
- Francesco Lippi, 1999. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 351, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2010.
"A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 647-677, June.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2010. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 647-677, June.
- Mr. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Mr. Eric Le Borgne, 2003. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," IMF Working Papers 2003/144, International Monetary Fund.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2005. "The politics of central bank independence: a theory of pandering and learning in government," Staff Reports 205, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Shun-ichiro Bessho & Kimiko Terai, 2013. "Fiscal restraints by advisors," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 205-232, August.
- Mr. Helmut Wagner, 2001. "Implications of Globalization for Monetary Policy," IMF Working Papers 2001/184, International Monetary Fund.
- Ullrich, Katrin, 2003. "Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-65, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Muriel Dal-Pont & Dominique Torre & Elise Tosi, 2004. "Short-term Deviations from Monetary Policy Commitment in a Monetary Union: The degrees of freedom of an independent Central Bank," Notas Económicas, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra, issue 20, pages 22-38, December.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:100:y:1998:i:2:p:495-512. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.