The Problem of Asymmetric Information: A Simulation of How Insurance Markets Can Be Inefficient
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DOI: j.1540-6296.2007.00108.x
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References listed on IDEAS
- Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
- Charles A. Holt & Roger Sherman, 1999. "Classroom Games: A Market for Lemons," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 205-214, Winter.
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Cited by:
- Kevin M. Gatzlaff, 2013. "Three Practical Assignments for the Introductory Risk Management and Insurance Student," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 281-294, September.
- John Garvey & Patrick Buckley, 2011. "Using Technology to Encourage Critical Thinking and Optimal Decision Making in Risk Management Education," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 14(2), pages 299-309, September.
- Kevin C. Ahlgrim & James R. Jones, 2014. "Insurance Rating Games: Strikes, Spares, and Bags," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 17(2), pages 297-313, September.
- Leon Chen & Puneet Jaiprakash, 2017. "An Insurance Market Simulation With Both Adverse and Advantageous Selection," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 20(1), pages 133-146, March.
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