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Firm‐level aggregate corruption and competition: The role of telecommunications infrastructure

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  • Ficawoyi Donou‐Adonsou
  • Gyan Pradhan
  • Hem C. Basnet

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between competition and corruption in the presence of enhanced telecommunications infrastructure. We use firm‐level aggregate data provided by the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and collected between 2006 and 2018. Our fixed‐effects results are two‐fold. First, the number of competing firms increases corruption in developing countries. This result is consistent with the previous literature on the competition‐corruption nexus. Second, corruption decreases as the number of competing firms increases in countries with better information and communication technology endowment. Our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity via the two‐step, feasible efficient generalized method of moments and suggest that e‐governance may help to reduce firm‐level corruption in a competitive environment. Given the negative impact of corruption on investment and growth, developing countries should aim at adopting and using more telecommunications infrastructure, along with the traditional approaches of combatting corruption that are based on enforcing rules of law or building stronger institutions, just to name a few, to boost investment and economic growth. 本研究分析了电信基础设施提升一事中竞争与腐败之间的关系。我们住用2006–2018年间世界银行企业调查提供的公司级别的聚合数据。我们的固定效应结果有两个。第一，对发展中国家而言，相互竞争的公司数量会加剧腐败。该结果与关于竞争‐腐败关系的以往文献结果相一致。第二，在信息通信技术禀赋更佳的国家中，腐败会随着相互竞争的公司数量的增多而减少。通过由两部分组成的可行高效广义矩估计对内生性加以控制，我们的研究结果是稳健的，并暗示电子治理可能帮助减少竞争性环境中的公司腐败。鉴于腐败对投资和增长造成的消极影响，发展中国家应致力采纳并住用更多的电信基础设施，同时住用打击腐败的传统措施，这些措施基于执行法治或建立更强的制度等，以期增加投资和经济增长。 Este estudio examina la relación entre competencia y corrupción en presencia de una infraestructura de telecomunicaciones mejorada. Utilizamos datos agregados a nivel de empresa proporcionados por las Encuestas de Empresas del Banco Mundial y recopilados entre 2006–2018. Nuestros resultados de efectos fijos son dobles. Primero, el número de empresas competidoras aumenta la corrupción en los países en desarrollo. Este resultado es consistente con la literatura previa sobre el nexo competencia‐corrupción. En segundo lugar, la corrupción disminuye a medida que aumenta el número de empresas competidoras en países con mejor dotación de tecnología de la información y las comunicaciones. Nuestros resultados son sólidos para controlar la endogeneidad a través del método generalizado de dos pasos, factible, eficiente y de momentos y sugieren que la gobernanza electrónica puede ayudar a reducir la corrupción a nivel de empresa en un entorno competitivo. Dado el impacto negativo de la corrupción en la inversión y el crecimiento, los países en desarrollo deben apuntar a adoptar y utilizar más infraestructura de telecomunicaciones, junto con los enfoques tradicionales para combatir la corrupción que se basan en hacer cumplir las normas de derecho o construir instituciones más fuertes, solo por nombrar algunos. impulsar la inversión y el crecimiento económico.

Suggested Citation

  • Ficawoyi Donou‐Adonsou & Gyan Pradhan & Hem C. Basnet, 2022. "Firm‐level aggregate corruption and competition: The role of telecommunications infrastructure," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 39(2), pages 199-218, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:39:y:2022:i:2:p:199-218
    DOI: 10.1111/ropr.12459
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