IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/reviec/v32y2024i1p109-131.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Divert when it does not hurt: The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015

Author

Listed:
  • Hana Attia

Abstract

A dominant argument in the literature is that leaders tend to initiate military disputes in periods plagued by economic distress. This article revisits the diversionary theory and adapts it to the use of economic sanctions in the United States, contending that their use follows a similar diversionary logic. Using a novel dataset on US sanctions from 1989 to 2015, I find that presidents are more likely to use sanctions when unemployment is high and the president's party power in Congress is weak. I show that when doing so presidents opt for sanctions that inflict little harm on the US economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Hana Attia, 2024. "Divert when it does not hurt: The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 109-131, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:32:y:2024:i:1:p:109-131
    DOI: 10.1111/roie.12704
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12704
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/roie.12704?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mueller, John E., 1970. "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson1," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 18-34, March.
    2. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Kimberly Ann Elliott & Tess Cyrus & Elizabeth Winston, 1997. "US Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages," Working Paper Series Working Paper Special (2), Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    3. Margaret P. Doxey, 1987. "International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-18750-8.
    4. Tyler Kustra, 2022. "Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(3), pages 443-472, April.
    5. Cameron,A. Colin & Trivedi,Pravin K., 2013. "Regression Analysis of Count Data," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107014169, November.
    6. Ostrom, Charles W. & Job, Brian L., 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 541-566, June.
    7. Howell, William G. & Pevehouse, Jon C., 2005. "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 209-232, January.
    8. Susan Hannah Allen, 2005. "The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(2), pages 117-138, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Susan Hannah Allen, 2008. "The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(6), pages 916-944, December.
    2. B. Dan Wood, 2009. "Presidential Saber Rattling and the Economy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 695-709, July.
    3. Jong Hee Park, 2010. "Structural Change in U.S. Presidents' Use of Force," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 766-782, July.
    4. Jin Mun Jeong & Dursun Peksen, 2019. "Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 194-217, January.
    5. Kyle Haynes, 2017. "Diversionary conflict: Demonizing enemies or demonstrating competence?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(4), pages 337-358, July.
    6. Gabriel Felbermayr & Erdal Yalcin & Philipp Grübener, 2014. "Ökonomische Aspekte des Russlandkonfliktes: Ursachen, Kosten, Optionen," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(14), pages 35-43, July.
    7. T. Clifton Morgan & Kenneth N. Bickers, 1992. "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(1), pages 25-52, March.
    8. David J. Brulé & Bryan W. Marshall & Brandon C. Prins, 2010. "Opportunities and Presidential Uses of Force," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(5), pages 486-510, November.
    9. Bradley Lian & John R. Oneal, 1993. "Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(2), pages 277-300, June.
    10. Brzoska Michael, 2008. "Measuring the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-34, July.
    11. Diana Richards & T. Clifton Morgan & Rick K. Wilson & Valerie L. Schwebach & Garry D. Young, 1993. "Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 504-535, September.
    12. Mi Yung Yoon, 1997. "Explaining U.S. Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(4), pages 580-602, August.
    13. Christopher Gelpi, 1997. "Democratic Diversions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(2), pages 255-282, April.
    14. Gleb Aksenov & Ronglin Li & Qamar Abbas & Houlda Fambo & Sergey Popkov & Vadim Ponkratov & Mikhail Kosov & Izabella Elyakova & Marina Vasiljeva, 2023. "Development of Trade and Financial-Economical Relationships between China and Russia: A Study Based on the Trade Gravity Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-39, March.
    15. William D. Baker & John R. Oneal, 2001. "Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(5), pages 661-687, October.
    16. Ross A. Miller, 1999. "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(3), pages 388-402, June.
    17. Brett Ashley Leeds & David R. Davis, 1997. "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(6), pages 814-834, December.
    18. Luiz Paulo Fávero & Joseph F. Hair & Rafael de Freitas Souza & Matheus Albergaria & Talles V. Brugni, 2021. "Zero-Inflated Generalized Linear Mixed Models: A Better Way to Understand Data Relationships," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(10), pages 1-28, May.
    19. Riccardo (Jack) Lucchetti & Luca Pedini, 2020. "ParMA: Parallelised Bayesian Model Averaging for Generalised Linear Models," Working Papers 2020:28, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    20. repec:zbw:bofitp:2022_009 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Rodrigo Martins & Francisco Veiga, 2013. "Economic voting in Portuguese municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 317-334, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:32:y:2024:i:1:p:109-131. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.