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Dual Agent Distortions in Real Estate Transactions

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  • Ken H. Johnson
  • Zhenguo Lin
  • Jia Xie

Abstract

type="main"> This article investigates price distortions in dual agent real estate transactions. Consistent with the literature, we find that, on average, dual agent has a null effect on sale price. However, dual agent distortions on sale price emerge after controlling for the ownership of the property. Dual agent is associated with a 6.35% price premium on agent-owned properties, but a 25.10% price discount on government-owned properties and a 5.14% discount on bank-owned properties. In addition, market conditions also play an important role in such price distortions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ken H. Johnson & Zhenguo Lin & Jia Xie, 2015. "Dual Agent Distortions in Real Estate Transactions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 507-536, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:43:y:2015:i:2:p:507-536
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1540-6229.12073
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    Cited by:

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    2. Matthew Cypher & S. McKay Price & Spenser Robinson & Michael J. Seiler, 2018. "Price Signals and Uncertainty in Commercial Real Estate Transactions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 246-263, August.
    3. Ping Cheng & Zhenguo Lin & Yingchun Liu, 2021. "Competing Selling Strategies in the Housing Market," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 394-413, October.
    4. Ralph Siebert & Michael J. Seiler, 2020. "Why Do Buyers Pay Different Prices for Comparable Products? Evidence from the Housing Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 8337, CESifo.
    5. Lin, Zhenguo & Liu, Yingchun & Xie, Jia, 2024. "Market distortions with collusion of agents," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    6. Xiangou Deng & Zhaohui Li & Michael J. Seiler & Hua Sun, 2024. "Market Strength and Brokerage Choice in Residential Housing," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 741-777, November.
    7. Lawrence Kryzanowski & Yanting Wu & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Conflicts of interest and agent heterogeneity in buyer brokerage," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 51(1), pages 130-169, January.

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