Tax Structure and Natural Vacancy Rates in the Commercial Real Estate Market

A number of studies have postulated that the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA 1981) was responsible for the dramatic overbuilding that occurred between 1981 and 1986, primarily because returns became less sensitive to “real” demand. While there has been much research on how equilibrium or “natural” vacancy rates in the real estate market are determined, beginning with Rosen and Smith's seminal paper in 1983, virtually none of this work has dealt with the impact of the tax environment. This study makes an initial attempt to answer this question with respect to equilibrium vacancies resulting from tenant (or owner) turnover. A formal model is developed that considers as an objective function the landlord's desire to maximize his/her after‐tax equity returns in an environment of monopolistic competition in which individual projects face downward‐sloping demand curves, owing to market conditions and a degree of heterogeneity among tenants in search costs or some other characteristic. The natural vacancy rate is shown not to depend directly upon the tax environment, but to depend indirectly upon it only to the extent that equilibrium market rents are lowered. The nature of the vacancy response depends critically upon the shape of the tenant demand response relationship upon its transition to a lower‐rent region. This response is interactive with the degree of turnover and supply responsiveness within individual markets.