Risk preference interactions between individual farmers and small farmer groups: Experimental evidence from rural Ethiopia

The understanding of risk preference interactions among poor farmers in developing countries has important policy implications, as many programs that aim to alleviate poverty and address risk constraints are provided on a collective basis. We conduct a randomized field experiment in the drought‐prone parts of Northern Ethiopia and elicit from poor, vulnerable farmers their hypothetical willingness to pay using individual and group lottery games. Analyzing the certainty equivalent ratios (CERs), we find that farmer groups are more risk averse than individual farmers. When the risk of the lottery is high, the group CER is primarily determined by the most‐risk‐averse farmer of the group, and to a lesser extent, by the least. The median farmer contributes to the group CER only when the lottery risk is moderate. After participating in the group elicitation, individual farmers also become as risk averse as the group on average. Specifically, the median and the least‐risk‐averse farmers become significantly more risk averse while the most‐risk‐averse farmer is unaffected. Our results show that policymakers should carefully consider how social interactions in rural communities affect individual and group risk preference and whether social interactions also affect the participation and effectiveness of development programs.