Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices
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DOI: j.1756-2171.2010.00130.x
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Cited by:
- Matthew Gentry & Tong Li, 2014.
"Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(1), pages 315-344, January.
- Matthew Gentry & Tong Li, 2012. "Identification in auctions with selective entry," CeMMAP working papers CWP38/12, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Guillermo Marshall, 2024. "Identification in english auctions with shill bidding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 193-222, June.
- Ho, Kate & Rosen, Adam M., 2015.
"Partial Identification in Applied Research: Benefits and Challenges,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10883, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kate Ho & Adam Rosen, 2016. "Partial identification in applied research: benefits and challenges," CeMMAP working papers 45/16, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Kate Ho & Adam Rosen, 2016. "Partial identification in applied research: benefits and challenges," CeMMAP working papers CWP45/16, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Kate Ho & Adam M. Rosen, 2015. "Partial Identification in Applied Research: Benefits and Challenges," NBER Working Papers 21641, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kate Ho & Adam Rosen, 2015. "Partial identification in applied research: benefits and challenges," CeMMAP working papers 64/15, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Kate Ho & Adam Rosen, 2015. "Partial identification in applied research: benefits and challenges," CeMMAP working papers CWP64/15, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Marleen Marra, 2020.
"Sample Spacings for Identification: The Case of English Auctions with Absentee Bidding,"
SciencePo Working papers Main
hal-03878412, HAL.
- Marleen Marra, 2020. "Sample Spacings for Identification: The Case of English Auctions with Absentee Bidding," Working Papers hal-03878412, HAL.
- Francesca Molinari, 2020.
"Microeconometrics with Partial Identi?cation,"
CeMMAP working papers
CWP15/20, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Francesca Molinari, 2020. "Microeconometrics with Partial Identification," Papers 2004.11751, arXiv.org.
- Zincenko, Federico, 2018.
"Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 205(2), pages 303-335.
- Federico Zincenko, 2016. "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders," Working Paper 5855, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Giovanni Compiani & Philip Haile & Marcelo Sant’Anna, 2020.
"Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in US Offshore Oil Lease Auctions,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(10), pages 3872-3912.
- Giovanni Compiani & Phil Haile & Marcelo Sant'Anna, 2018. "Common values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous entry in U.S. offshore oil lease auctions," CeMMAP working papers CWP37/18, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Giovanni Compiani & Philip A. Haile & Marcelo Sant'Anna, 2018. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2137R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2019.
- Giovanni Compiani & Philip A. Haile & Marcelo Sant'Anna, 2018. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2137, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Giovanni Compiani & Philip Haile & Marcelo Sant'Anna, 2018. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auction," NBER Working Papers 24795, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2023.
"Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 815-851.
- Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W. Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2017. "Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds," NBER Working Papers 23473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matthew Gentry & Tong Li, 2012. "Identification in auctions with selective entry," CeMMAP working papers 38/12, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Beare, Brendan K. & Seo, Juwon, 2020.
"Randomization Tests Of Copula Symmetry,"
Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(6), pages 1025-1063, December.
- Brendan K. Beare & Juwon Seo, 2019. "Randomization tests of copula symmetry," Papers 1911.05307, arXiv.org.
- Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Kane Sweeney & Caio Waisman, 2021. "Scalable Optimal Online Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 593-618, July.
- Kaplan, Uma & Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2016. "Identifying Collusion in English Auctions," Microeconomics.ca working papers vadim_marmer-2016-3, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 08 Jul 2017.
- Francesca Molinari, 2019. "Econometrics with Partial Identification," CeMMAP working papers CWP25/19, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Hill, Jonathan B. & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2013. "Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 174(2), pages 144-164.
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