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Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices

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  • Xun Tang

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  • Xun Tang, 2011. "Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(1), pages 175-203, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:42:y:2011:i:1:p:175-203
    DOI: j.1756-2171.2010.00130.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Gentry & Tong Li, 2014. "Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(1), pages 315-344, January.
    2. Beare, Brendan K. & Seo, Juwon, 2020. "Randomization Tests Of Copula Symmetry," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(6), pages 1025-1063, December.
    3. Hill, Jonathan B. & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2013. "Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 174(2), pages 144-164.
    4. Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2023. "Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 815-851.
    5. Francesca Molinari, 2020. "Microeconometrics with Partial Identification," Papers 2004.11751, arXiv.org.
    6. Guillermo Marshall, 2024. "Identification in english auctions with shill bidding," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 193-222, June.
    7. Ho, Kate & Rosen, Adam M., 2015. "Partial Identification in Applied Research: Benefits and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 10883, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Kane Sweeney & Caio Waisman, 2021. "Scalable Optimal Online Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 593-618, July.
    9. Marleen Marra, 2020. "Sample Spacings for Identification: The Case of English Auctions with Absentee Bidding," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03878412, HAL.
    10. Zincenko, Federico, 2018. "Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 205(2), pages 303-335.
    11. Giovanni Compiani & Philip Haile & Marcelo Sant’Anna, 2020. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in US Offshore Oil Lease Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(10), pages 3872-3912.
    12. Matthew Gentry & Tong Li, 2012. "Identification in auctions with selective entry," CeMMAP working papers 38/12, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    13. Kaplan, Uma & Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2016. "Identifying Collusion in English Auctions," Microeconomics.ca working papers vadim_marmer-2016-3, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 08 Jul 2017.
    14. Francesca Molinari, 2019. "Econometrics with Partial Identification," CeMMAP working papers CWP25/19, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.

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