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Regional diffusion of military regimes in sub‐Saharan Africa

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  • Raul Caruso
  • Nicola Pontarollo
  • Roberto Ricciuti

Abstract

Military dictatorships have been decreasing in number and concentrating in Africa. This paper analyses their spatial diffusion in sub‐Saharan Africa between 1978 and 2014 applying a Bayesian SAR Probit regression. We find a significant and positive spatial coefficient only in the aftermath of the Cold War. This result suggests that once the global order of the Cold War vanished, geography took back its role and regional factors became crucial in shaping the institutional landscape. The evidence is interpreted in light of the patron‐client approach. Among covariates, a larger manufacturing sector is associated with a smaller probability of a military regime. Las dictaduras militares han ido disminuyendo en número y concentrándose en África. Este artículo analiza su difusión espacial en el África subsahariana entre 1978 y 2014 mediante la aplicación de una regresión Probit SAR bayesiana. Se encontró un coeficiente espacial significativo y positivo sólo durante las secuelas de la Guerra Fría. Este resultado sugiere que una vez que desapareció el orden global de la Guerra Fría, la geografía recuperó su papel y los factores regionales se volvieron cruciales en la conformación del paisaje institucional. La evidencia se interpreta bajo el enfoque patrón‐cliente. Entre las covariables, un sector manufacturero más grande está asociado con una menor probabilidad de un régimen militar. 軍事独裁政権の数は減少しているものの、アフリカに集中している。本稿では、1978~2014年のアフリカのサブサハラ地域におけるその空間分布状況を、ベイズ推定に基づく空間自己回帰型のプロビットモデルを用いて分析した。冷戦後の状況においてのみ、有意かつ正の空間係数が得られることが示される。この結果から、冷戦時の世界情勢が消滅した後は、地理がその役割を取り戻し、地域的要因が制度的景観を形成する上で重要になったことが示唆される。そのエビデンスをパトロン‐クライアント関係のアプローチにより解釈した。共変量の中では、製造セクターが大きいほど軍事政権の可能性は低い。

Suggested Citation

  • Raul Caruso & Nicola Pontarollo & Roberto Ricciuti, 2020. "Regional diffusion of military regimes in sub‐Saharan Africa," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(1), pages 225-244, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:presci:v:99:y:2020:i:1:p:225-244
    DOI: 10.1111/pirs.12479
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    References listed on IDEAS

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