Commitment Rather than Independence: An Institutional Design for Reducing the Inflationary Bias of Monetary Policy
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1996.tb01402.x
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Citations
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Cited by:
- James Forder, 2000. "Traps in the Measurement of Independence and Accountability of Central Banks," Economics Series Working Papers 23, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- H.M. Prast, 1996. "Inflation, unemployment and the position of the central bank: the opinion of the public," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(199), pages 415-454.
- H.M. Prast, 1996. "Inflation, unemployment and the position of the central bank: the opinion of the public," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(199), pages 415-454.
- H. Prast, 1998. "Inflation, distortionary taxation and the design of monetary policy: the role of social cohesion," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 51(204), pages 37-53.
- Cem Mehmet Baydur & Bora Suslu & Selahattin Bekmez, 2004. "The independence of central bank in view of Rogoff: The Turkish experience," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1-2), pages 143-143.
- Andreas Freytag, 2001.
"Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations,"
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 181-208.
- Andreas Freytag, 2001. "Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 181-208.
- James Forder, 2002. "Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 51-69.
- H. Prast, 1998. "Inflation, distortionary taxation and the design of monetary policy: the role of social cohesion," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 51(204), pages 37-53.
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