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Insurance, Consumer Search, and Equilibrium Price Distributions

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  • Ş. Nuray Akın
  • Brennan C. Platt

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="en"> We examine a service market with two frictions: search is required to obtain price quotes, and insurance coverage for the service reduces household search effort. While fewer draws from a price distribution will directly raise a household's average price, the indirect effect of reduced search on price competition has a much greater impact, accounting for at least 89 percent of increased average expenditures. In this environment, a monopolist insurer will exacerbate the moral hazard by offering full insurance. A competitive insurance market typically results in partial insurance and significant price dispersion, yet a second-best contract would offer even less insurance coverage.

Suggested Citation

  • Ş. Nuray Akın & Brennan C. Platt, 2014. "Insurance, Consumer Search, and Equilibrium Price Distributions," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 81(2), pages 397-429, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:81:y:2014:i:2:p:397-429
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    Cited by:

    1. Taghreed Abu-Salim & Okey Peter Onyia & Tina Harrison & Valerie Lindsay, 2017. "Effects of perceived cost, service quality, and customer satisfaction on health insurance service continuance," Journal of Financial Services Marketing, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(4), pages 173-186, December.
    2. Peter Zweifel & Annette Hofmann, 2024. "Can Multi-Peril Insurance Policies Mitigate Adverse Selection?," Risks, MDPI, vol. 12(6), pages 1-17, June.
    3. Urmann, Oliver, 2012. "Insurance in vertically differentiated repair markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 121-123.
    4. Chernew, Michael & Cooper, Zack & Hallock, Eugene Larsen & Scott Morton, Fiona, 2021. "Physician agency, consumerism, and the consumption of lower-limb MRI scans," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).

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