IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jrinsu/v79y2012i4p1051-1075.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A History of the Term “Moral Hazard”

Author

Listed:
  • David Rowell
  • Luke B. Connelly

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, 2012. "A History of the Term “Moral Hazard”," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(4), pages 1051-1075, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:79:y:2012:i:4:p:1051-1075
    DOI: j.1539-6975.2011.01448.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2011.01448.x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/j.1539-6975.2011.01448.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Cecchetti & Schoenholtz — Moral Hazard: A Primer
      by contrarianmedia@hotmail.com (Mike Norman) in Mike Norman Economics on 2017-09-25 19:17:00
    2. Moral Hazard: A Primer
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2017-09-25 17:57:58

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paul J. Burke, 2016. "Undermined by Adverse Selection: Australia's Direct Action Abatement Subsidies," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 35(3), pages 216-229, September.
    2. Tan, Ken Seng & Wei, Pengyu & Wei, Wei & Zhuang, Sheng Chao, 2020. "Optimal dynamic reinsurance policies under a generalized Denneberg’s absolute deviation principle," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(1), pages 345-362.
    3. Michael D. Eriksen & James M. Carson, 2017. "A Burning Question: Does Arson Increase When Local House Prices Decline?," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(1), pages 7-34, March.
    4. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
    5. Bixter, Michael T. & Luhmann, Christian C., 2014. "Shared losses reduce sensitivity to risk: A laboratory study of moral hazard," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 63-73.
    6. Rewczuk Karol & Modzelewski Piotr, 2019. "Determinants of audit fees: Evidence from Poland," Central European Economic Journal, Sciendo, vol. 6(53), pages 323-336, January.
    7. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    8. Batifoulier, Philippe, 2015. "Aux origines de la privatisation du financement du soin : quand la théorie de l’aléa moral rencontre le capitalisme sanitaire," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
    9. Mahito Okura, 2013. "The relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 14(2), pages 120-128, February.
    10. Philippe Batifoulier, 2014. "De l’aléa moral du patient aux inégalités d’accès aux soins," Working Papers hal-04141361, HAL.
    11. Schmid, Günther, 2020. "Beyond European unemployment insurance. Less moral hazard, more moral assurance?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 26(4), pages 465-480.
    12. Mol, Jantsje M. & Botzen, W. J. Wouter & Blasch, Julia E., 2020. "Risk reduction in compulsory disaster insurance: Experimental evidence on moral hazard and financial incentives," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    13. Imen Karaa, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Learning in the Tunisian Automobile Insurance Market: New Evidence from Dynamic Data," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(3), pages 560-589, July.
    14. Guangdong Wu & Jian Zuo & Xianbo Zhao, 2017. "Incentive Model Based on Cooperative Relationship in Sustainable Construction Projects," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(7), pages 1-20, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:79:y:2012:i:4:p:1051-1075. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ariaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.