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Majority Voting over Publicly Provided Goods, Redistribution, and Income Taxation

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  • STEPHEN M. CALABRESE

Abstract

Federal, state, and many local governments make decisions that involve taxation, redistribution, and provision of public goods. Positive models to study these issues encounter the well‐known problem that majority‐voting equilibrium (MVE) may fail to exist in such multidimensional models. In this paper, with reasonable restrictions on preferences, I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an MVE in a model with linear income tax and government expenditure policies that affect individual labor/leisure choices. My majority‐voting result takes account of the possibility that low‐skill individuals will drop out of the labor force under some tax and expenditure configurations.

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  • Stephen M. Calabrese, 2007. "Majority Voting over Publicly Provided Goods, Redistribution, and Income Taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 319-334, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:2:p:319-334
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00309.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson, 1994. "Income Distribution and Public Education: A Dynamic Quantitative Evaluation of School Finance Reform," NBER Working Papers 4883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Stephen Calabrese & Dennis Epple, 2010. "On the political economy of tax limits," Working Papers 2010/14, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    3. Stephen Calabrese & Dennis Epple, 2010. "On the political economy of tax limits," Working Papers 2010/14, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
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    Cited by:

    1. Dotti, Valerio, 2020. "Income inequality, size of government, and tax progressivity: A positive theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    2. Ricardo Martínez & Juan D. Moreno‐Ternero, 2024. "Redistribution with needs," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(1), February.
    3. Граборов С.В., 2015. "Мажоритарная Оптимизация Налогов, Трансфертов, Цен И Заработных Плат," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 51(1), pages 80-96, январь.

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