Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments
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Cited by:
- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2015.
"Centralized allocation in multiple markets,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 74-85.
- Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2012. "Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets," Economics Working Papers 2012-09, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Monte, Daniel & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "Centralized allocation in multiple markets," Textos para discussão 322, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
- Eduardo M Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2019.
"Strategy-proofness in the Large,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 81-116.
- Eduardo M. Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2017. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," NBER Working Papers 23771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013.
"Strategy-Proof Package Assignment,"
Working Papers
2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2014. "Strategy-proof package assignment," Discussion Papers on Economics 5/2014, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
- Gian Caspari, 2023. "A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 8(1), pages 75-96, December.
- Masahiro KAWASAKI & Ryosuke SAKAI & Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2023. "Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit objectassignment problems with money," Discussion papers e-23-007, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Bichler, Martin & Merting, Sören, 2018. "Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 270(2), pages 775-783.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Bó, Inácio, 2022. "Strategy-proof popular mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
- ,, 2015. "Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
- Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2017. "On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 857-875, April.
- Kojima, Fuhito, 2009. "Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 134-142, January.
- Hoda Atef Yekta & Robert Day, 2020. "Optimization-based Mechanisms for the Course Allocation Problem," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 641-660, July.
- Masahiro KAWASAKI & Ryosuke SAKAI & Tomoya KAZUMURA, "undated". "Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money," Discussion papers e-23-007-v2, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Mustafa Oguz Afacan & Nejat Anbarci & Ozgur Kıbrıs, 2022. "Arbiter Assignment," Working Papers 2022_02, Durham University Business School.
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