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Global public goods and unilateral matching mechanisms

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  • Wolfgang Buchholz
  • Weifeng Liu

Abstract

While conventional agreements on international public goods require bilateral or multilateral cooperation, we show that unilateral action through matching mechanisms with a self‐commitment device can possibly generate Pareto‐improving outcomes. Even without commitment, unilateral matching may also benefit both players at corner situations. We further characterize the conditions under which this desirable outcome is achieved, particularly highlighting the role of the income distribution and its interplay with the preferences. Moreover, we propose a variant of unilateral matching that can generate Pareto‐improving outcomes regardless of the preferences and the income distribution, indicating that income inequality may not be an obstacle for improving public good provision through unilateral matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Buchholz & Weifeng Liu, 2020. "Global public goods and unilateral matching mechanisms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(2), pages 338-354, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:2:p:338-354
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12300
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    Cited by:

    1. Funashima, Yoshito, 2022. "Efficiency and group size in the voluntary provision of public goods with threshold preference," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 237-251.
    2. Matthew McGinty, 2021. "Rational conjectures and evolutionary beliefs in public goods games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1130-1143, December.

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