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Committees and Special Interests

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  • MIKE FELGENHAUER
  • HANS PETER GRÜNER

Abstract

This paper studies the aggregation of decentralized information in committees under open and closed voting in the presence of external influence. We show that under one‐sided influence decision quality may be nonmonotonic in the committee members' ability. Furthermore, restricting the information of interest groups may reduce the bias toward special interest politics. This result holds in a single and in a common agency setting, where opposing interest groups' activities do not cancel out in equilibrium. Moreover, there are cases where benefits from increasing the number of decision makers can only be reaped if the committee's sessions are not public.

Suggested Citation

  • Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Peter Grüner, 2008. "Committees and Special Interests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 219-243, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:2:p:219-243
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00359.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Feddersen, Timothy J. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1999. "Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(2), pages 381-398, June.
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    5. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2004. "Voting Transparency, Conflicting Interests, And The Appointment Of Central Bankers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 321-345, November.
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    7. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Timothy J. Fedderson & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences," Discussion Papers 1195, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Zápal, 2017. "Crafting consensus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 169-200, October.
    2. Grüner, Hans Peter & Felgenhauer, Mike, 2007. "Safety Nets Within Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 6317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Arnab Bhattacharjee & Sean Holly, 2010. "Rational Partisan Theory, Uncertainty, And Spatial Voting: Evidence For The Bank Of England'S Mpc," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 151-179, July.
    4. Arnab Bhattacharjee & Sean Holly, 2013. "Understanding Interactions in Social Networks and Committees," Spatial Economic Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 23-53, March.
    5. Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai, 2015. "A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 465-480.
    6. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2010. "Transparency and special interests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 4-7, January.
    7. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    8. Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Voting in the limelight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 65-103, July.
    9. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 15311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2009. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(5), pages 831-853, August.
    11. Esteban Colla de Robertis, 2010. "Monetary Policy Committees and the Decision to Publish Voting Records," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 97-139, July-Dece.
    12. Mike Felgenhauer, 2012. "Revealing information in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 55-68, October.
    13. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
    14. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2022. "Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 153-176.
    15. Winschel, Evguenia, 2012. "Coalition formation for unpopular reform in the presence of private reputation costs," Working Papers 13-08, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    16. Chen, Ying & Zápal, Jan, 2022. "Sequential vote buying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    17. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Moumita Deb & Johannes Lohse & Rebecca McDonald, 2024. "The swing voter's curse revisited: Transparency's impact on committee voting," Discussion Papers 24-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    18. Mike Felgenhauer, 2007. "Policy Bias Equivalence under Common Agency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 295-312, April.
    19. Louis-Sidois, Charles & Musolff, Leon Andreas, 2024. "Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
    20. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    21. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Deb, Moumita & Lohse, Johannes & McDonald, Rebecca, 2024. "The Swing Voter’s Curse Revisited: Transparency’s Impact on Committee Voting," Working Papers 0744, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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