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Divisional versus company-wide focus: The trade-off between allocation of managerial attention and screening of talent

Author

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  • Darrough, MN
  • Melumad, ND

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Darrough, MN & Melumad, ND, 1995. "Divisional versus company-wide focus: The trade-off between allocation of managerial attention and screening of talent," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33, pages 65-94.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:33:y:1995:i::p:65-94
    DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2491375
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Arya, Anil & Fellingham, John & Glover, Jonathan, 1997. "Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 7-30, May.
    2. Denise Ewerlin & Stefan Süß, 2014. "Verbreitung und Gestaltung des Talentmanagements in deutschen Unternehmen — Eine empirische Analyse," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 69-92, February.
    3. Gan, Huiqi & Park, Myung Seok, 2016. "Are more able CEOs getting more compensated? Evidence from the pay-for-performance sensitivity of equity-based incentives," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 64-76.
    4. Rajiv D. Banker & Masako Darrough & Shaopeng Li & Lucas Threinen, 2019. "The Value of Precontract Information About an Agent's Ability in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(5), pages 1201-1245, December.
    5. Pierre Jinghong Liang & Lin Nan, 2014. "Endogenous Precision of Performance Measures and Limited Managerial Attention," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 693-727, December.
    6. Brian Cadman & Richard Carrizosa & Xiaoxia Peng, 2020. "Inducement grants, hiring announcements, and adverse selection for new CEOs," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 279-312, March.
    7. Sangyong Han & Hyejeong Mun, 2021. "CEO Compensation in Korea: Is It Different than in the US? A Comparison between Korean Non-Life Insurance Firms and US Property-Liability Insurance Firms," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-20, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reward structures; Managerial focus; Allocation of managerial attention; Screening of talent;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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