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Communication And Post-Decision Information

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  • DYE, RA

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Dye, Ra, 1983. "Communication And Post-Decision Information," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 514-533.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:21:y:1983:i:2:p:514-533
    DOI: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2490788
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Villadsen, Bente, 1995. "Communication and delegation in collusive agencies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 315-344, April.
    2. Bala V. Balachandran & Lode Li & Robert P. Magee, 1987. "On the allocation of fixed and variable costs from service departments," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 164-185, September.
    3. Richard A. Young, 2000. "Discussion of “Accounting Recognition, Moral Hazard, and Communicationâ€," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 491-496, September.
    4. Shota Otomasa & Atsushi Shiiba & Akinobu Shuto, 2015. "Management Earnings Forecasts as a Performance Target in Executive Compensation Contracts," CARF F-Series CARF-F-368, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    5. Versano, Tsahi, 2021. "Silence can be golden: On the value of allowing managers to keep silent when information is soft," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).
    6. Haijin Lin, 2006. "Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(4), pages 1017-1041, December.
    7. Fisher, Joseph & Frederickson, James R. & Peffer, Sean A., 2002. "The effect of information asymmetry on negotiated budgets: an empirical investigation," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(1-2), pages 27-43.
    8. John Christensen & Joel Demski, 1995. "Project selection and audited accrual measurement in a multi-task setting," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 405-432.
    9. Peter Ove Christensen & Gerald A. Feltham, 1993. "Communication in Multiperiod Agencies with Production and Financial Decisions," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(2), pages 706-744, March.
    10. Nikolaj Kirkeby Niebuhr, 2020. "Managerial Overconfidence and Self-Reported Success," Economics Working Papers 2020-01, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    11. Chow, Chee W. & Hwang, Richard Nen-Chen & Liao, Woody & Wu, Anne, 1998. "National culture and subordinates' upward communication of private information," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 293-311.
    12. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
    13. George W. Blazenko & William R. Scott, 1986. "A model of standard setting in auditing," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(1), pages 68-92, September.
    14. Peter O. Christensen & Gerald A. Feltham, 2001. "Efficient Timing of Communication in Multiperiod Agencies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(2), pages 280-294, February.
    15. Peter O. Christensen & Hans Frimor & Florin Şabac, 2020. "Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(1), pages 514-541, March.
    16. Chee W. Chow & Mark K. Hirst & Michael D. Shields, 1994. "Motivating Truthful Subordinate Reporting: An Experimental Investigation in a Two†Subordinate Context," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(2), pages 699-720, March.
    17. Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Hans Frimor & Brian Mittendorf, 2006. "On the Role of Receivables in Managing Salesforce Incentives," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 311-324.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Communication; Agency model; Contracting; Communication;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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