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Preemptive Adoptions of an Emerging Technology

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  • Riordan, Michael H
  • Salant, David J

Abstract

Many oligopolies exhibit continuing technological change and lumpy costs of adopting new technologies. If firms choose adoption dates in a game of timing and if the downstream market structure is a Bertrand duopoly, the equilibrium adoption pattern displays rent-dissipating increasing dominance, i.e., all adoptions are by the same firm, and the discounted value of profits is zero. These results need not hold for other market structures, including Cournot duopoly. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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  • Riordan, Michael H & Salant, David J, 1994. "Preemptive Adoptions of an Emerging Technology," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 247-261, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:42:y:1994:i:3:p:247-61
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Munan & Porter, Alan L. & Suominen, Arho, 2018. "Insights into relationships between disruptive technology/innovation and emerging technology: A bibliometric perspective," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 285-296.
    2. Bergman, Mats A., 1998. "Endogenous Timing of Investments Yields Modified Stackelberg Outcomes," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 272, Stockholm School of Economics.
    3. Fedor Iskhakov & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2018. "The Dynamics Of Bertrand Price Competition With Cost‐Reducing Investments," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1681-1731, November.
    4. A. Mahathi & Rupayan Pal & Vinay Ramani, 2016. "Competition, strategic delegation and delay in technology adoption," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 143-171, March.
    5. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2019. "Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    6. Benoit Voudon, 2019. "Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Market Structure," Trinity Economics Papers tep0819, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    7. Manganelli, Anton-Giulio, 2023. "Pay-for-delay settlements and patent expansion practices," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. John Rust & Bertel Schjerning & Fedor Iskhakov, 2012. "A Dynamic Model of Leap-Frogging Investments and Bertrand Price Competition," 2012 Meeting Papers 370, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Maria Alipranti & Chrysovalantou Miliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2014. "On Vertical Relations and Technology Adoption Timing," Working Papers 1502, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    10. Sun Chia-Hung, 2020. "Timing of Adopting a Flexible Manufacturing System and Product Differentiation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-17, April.
    11. Greenstein, Shane & Ramey, Garey, 1998. "Market structure, innovation and vertical product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 285-311, May.

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